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Abstract
Some applications of noncommutative groups
and semigroups to information security
by
Lisa Bromberg
Adviser: Professor Vladimir Shpilrain
We present evidence why the Burnside groups of exponent 3 could be a good candidate for
a platform group for the HKKS semidirect product key exchange protocol. We also explore
hashing with matrices over SL2(Fp), and compute bounds on the girth of the Cayley graph
of the subgroup of SL2(Fp) for specific generators A,B. We demonstrate that even without
optimization, these hashes have comparable performance to hashes in the SHA family.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Cryptography
1.1 Public Key Cryptography
The aim of cryptography is to protect information from being stolen or modified by an
adversary. In modern cryptography, specific security goals are achieved with the design
of algorithms and also using the known computational hardness of certain mathematical
problems.
There are currently two main classes of cryptographic primitives: public-key (assymetric)
and symmetric-key. Symmetric-key algorithms are older, and in fact can be traced back to
at least the time of Julius Caesar. In symmetric-key ciphers, knowledge of the encryption
key is usually equivalent (or equal) to knowledge of the decryption key. Because of this,
participating parties need to agree on a shared secret key before communicating through an
open channel.
Public-key cryptography is a relatively young area of mathematics, but it has been a
very active area of research since its inception in 1976, with a seminal paper of Diffie and
Hellman [9]. In public-key algorithms, there are two separate keys: a public key that is
published and a private key which each user keeps secret. Knowledge of the public key does
1
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not imply knowledge of the private key with any efficient computation. In fact, the public
key is generated from the private key using a one-way function, with a trapdoor, which is a
function that is easy (i.e. polynomial-time with respect to the complexity of an input) to
compute, but hard (no visible (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithm on “most” inputs)
to invert the image of a random input without special information; the special information
is the above-mentioned “trapdoor”. A well-known example of public-key encryption is the
RSA cryptosystem, whose one-way function is the product of two large primes p, q. If p
and q are known, then it is easy to compute their product, but it is hard to factor a large
number into its prime factors.
Since public-key cryptosystems are more computationally costly than symmetric algo-
rithms, some modern cryptosystems rely on an assymetric cipher to produce a session key,
and then proceed with symmetric encryption for the remainder of the session.
1.2 Problems common in cryptography
Most classic cryptographic primitives involve the use of finite abelian (commutative) groups.
The two main problems security in this setting relies on are factoring and the discrete log-
arithm. Our current technology keeps these problems hard, but there are efficient quantum
algorithms which solve both of these. This motivated research in expanding cryptographic
primitives which are based on other areas of mathematics. In particular, there is a lot of
research in cryptography based on noncommutative groups.
Some problems used in noncommutative cryptography are based on combinatorial group
theory. For more details on those problems, see Myasnikov, Shpilrain and Ushakov [38].
The problems from group theory we are concerned with fall into three main types: decision,
witness and search problems.
Decision problems Given an object O and a property P , determine whether O has
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property P .
Witness problems Given an object O with a property P , find a proof of the fact
that O has property P .
Search problems Given an object O with a property P , find something ‘material’
establishing the property P . (An example we are particularly interested in is the conjugacy
search problem; see below.)
Note that search problems are in fact a special case of witness problems.
We now introduce several commonly used problems in noncommutative cryptography.
Let G be a finitely presented group with presentation 〈X | R〉, where X is the set of
generators and R is the set of relators. We let 1 denote the identity, and yx := x−1yx for all
x, y ∈ G.
Word Problem Given a group G and an element g ∈ G, determine whether g =G 1.
The word search problem (WSP) is: given an element g ∈ G such that g =G 1, find a
presentation of g as a product of conjugates of defining relators and their inverses.
Membership Problem Given a subgroup H ≤ G and an element g ∈ G, determine
whether g ∈ H. The membership search problem (MSP) is: given a subgroup H ≤ G
generated by h1, . . . , hk and an element h ∈ H, find a presentation of h in terms of the
generators h1, . . . , hk. A cryptosystem of Shpilrain and Zapata [50] makes use of the subgroup
membership search problem.
Conjugacy Problem Given g, h ∈ G, determine whether there exists x ∈ G such that
gx = h. The conjugacy search problem (CSP) is: given g, h ∈ G such that they are conjugate,
find an x ∈ G such that gx = h.
There are variants of the conjugacy search problem, such as the simultaneous conjugacy
search problem, which are employed in the Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld key-exchange proto-
col [1]. The conjugacy search problem has been used for several other cryptographic pro-
tocols, such as the noncommutative Diffie–Hellman key exchange [29], the noncommutative
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El-Gamal encryption [24], the noncommutative Cramer–Shoup key exchange [23] and non-
commutative digital signatures [25].
1.3 Platform groups
For any noncommutative cryptographic primitive, there are several requirements we have of
the platform group used. For more details on these requirements, see Myasnikov, Shpilrain
and Ushakov [38, 39].
First, the group G should be recursively presented; this allows us to encode the group in
a computer system.
We also require that the word problem in G can be solved efficiently so that the parties
involved can know they have the same common key. Normal form can be used to disguise
elements of G, and also implies that the word problem can be solved.
While we do want the word problem to be solvable, we require that some algorithm
problem for G have no efficient solution. In general, this is hard to prove, so in practice we
expect only that one or more search problems for the group G has been well-studied and
that no efficient solution has been found.
To ensure a large enough key space, we require that G have exponential or intermediate
(as opposed to polynomial) growth rate. The growth function of a group G tells us the
number of elements of G with length n. Having nonpolynomial growth makes the key space
large, which prevents a brute force attack.
Less formal and articulated considerations for the platform group include things like
the ease of implementation of G (we should not pick a platform group which is hard for
participants to compute with).
Chapter 2
Ramifications of the Diffie–Hellman
key exchange protocol
In this chapter we talk about a key exchange protocol introduced by Habeeb, Kahrobaei,
Koupparis and Shpilrain [16], which we will refer to as the HKKS protocol. It is an extension
to nonabelian groups of the Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange, using the semidirect product
and extensions by automorphisms.
2.1 Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol
In a seminal paper, Diffie and Hellman introduced the first public key exchange protocol [9].
Originally, the protocol uses the multiplicative group of integers modulo a prime p, G =
(Z/pZ)∗, and a primitive element g of G (i.e. g generates G). We can explain the protocol
using an arbitrary cyclic group.
Algorithm 1 (DH key exchange protocol). (1) Alice and Bob agree on a (public) finite
cyclic group G and a generating element g of G.
(2) Alice picks a random number a and sends ga to Bob.
5
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(3) Bob picks a random number b and sends gb to Alice.
(4) Alice computes KA := (g
b)a = gba.
(5) Bob computes KB := (g
a)b = gab.
Since ab = ba, Alice and Bob have a shared secret key.
The security of the Diffie–Hellman protocol is based on the difficulty of the Diffie–Hellman
problem.
Definition 1 (Diffie–Hellman problem). Given a finite cyclic group G, a generating ele-
ment g, and ga, gb, where a, b ∈ N, find gab.
A stronger problem is the discrete logarithm problem.
Definition 2 (Discrete logarithm problem). Given a finite cyclic group G, a generating
element g, and ga where a ∈ N, find a.
It is evident that an efficient algorithm which solves the discrete logarithm problem
will also solve the Diffie–Hellman problem: use the algorithm to recover a, b from ga, gb
respectively. Then simply compute gab. However, it is not currently known whether the two
problems are equivalent.
2.2 Ko-Lee key exchange
One of the possible generalizations of the discrete logarithm problem is the conjugacy search
problem: given two elements a, b of a group G, and the knowledge that there exists x ∈ G
such that ax := x−1ax = b, find at least one particular element x which conjugates a to b.
The (alleged) computational difficulty of solving this problem in groups such as braid groups
has been used in several cryptosystems. We outline one of those here, namely the Ko–Lee
key exchange protocol.
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Algorithm 2 (Ko–Lee key exchange protocol). Let G be a nonabelian group, and recall
that the notation ax denotes conjugation: ax = x−1ax. An element w ∈ G is public. Two
subgroups A,B of G such that [A,B] = 1G are also public (i.e. ab = ba for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B).
(1) Alice chooses an element a ∈ A and sends wa to Bob, while keeping a private.
(2) Bob chooses an element b ∈ B and sends wb to Alice, while keeping b private.
(3) Alice computes KA = (w
b)a = wba.
(4) Bob computes KB = (w
a)b = wab.
Since ab = ba for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B, we have that KA = KB is the shared secret key K.
Their proposed system was based on using braid groups. The n–braid group Brn is an
infinite noncommutative group of n–braids defined for each positive integer n. A geometric
interpretation is as follows: an n–braid is a set of n disjoint strands, all of which are at-
tached to two horizontal bars at the top and the bottom such that each strand always heads
downward as one walks along the strand from top to bottom. See [29, Section 2] for a more
detailed definition.
As these groups play a role in areas of math including low-dimensional topology, com-
binatorial group theory and representation theiry, they are well-studied groups. For an
adversary to find the shared secret key K, they could solve the conjugacy search problem,
which Ko–Lee describe as being mathematically hard.
However, in [49], Shpilrain and Ushakov explain that it is sufficient for an adversary to
find a1, a2 such that a1wa2 = a
−1wa and b1, b2 such that b1wb2 = b−1wb, since if we also
suppose that a1, a2 commute with all b ∈ B, then we have
a1b1wa2b2 = a1b
−1wba2 = b−1awab = b−1a−1wab = K.
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Note that a1, a2, b1, b2 have nothing to do with Alice and Bob’s private elements. In partic-
ular, it is not necessary for the adversary to solve the conjugacy search problem, but rather
it is sufficient to solve the apparently easier decomposition problem, which has the conjugacy
search problem as a special case.
2.3 The HKKS key exchange protocol
Since it is now a prevalent opinion that the conjugacy search problem is unlikely to provide a
sufficient level of security if a noncommutative group is used as the platform, we investigate
a different direction to take. In this section we will describe the key exchange protocol
introduced in [16]. But first we will give some background on the semidirect product.
2.3.1 Semidirect Product
Definition 3. Let G,H be two groups, let Aut(G) be the group of automorphisms of G and
let ϕ : H → Aut(G) be a homomorphism. Then the semidirect product of G and H is the
set
Goϕ H = {(g, h) | g ∈ G, h ∈ H}
with the group operation
(g, h) · (g′, h′) = (gϕ(h′) · g′, h · h′).
Note that gϕ(h
′) denotes ϕ(h′)(g) and h · h′ denotes composition with h applied first.
If H = Aut(G), then the corresponding semidirect product is called the holomorph of G,
and is the set of all (g, φ) with g ∈ G, φ ∈ Aut(G) with group operation (g, φ) · (g′, φ′) =
(φ′(g) · φ, φ · φ′).
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A special case of the HKKS construction is extension by automorphisms where we do not
use the whole group Aut(G) but only a cyclic subgroup of it, which is generated by a fixed
φ ∈ Aut(G). The resulting object Γ is also a group. Since every automorphism that we are
concerned with now is an element of 〈φ〉, the group operation becomes
(g, φr)(h, φs) = (φs(g) · h, φr+s).
In particular, to calculate exponents of an element of Γ, we have
(g, φ)m = (g, φ) · (g, φ) · (g, φ)m−2
= (φ(g) · g, φ2) · (g, φ) · (g, φ)m−3
= (φ2(g) · φ(g) · g, φ3) · (g, φ) · (g, φ)m−4
= . . .
= (φm−1(g) · φm−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φm)
This construction works just as well with a semigroup G and and endomorphism φ instead
of a group and an automorphism. In that case, the resulting object Γ is a semigroup instead.
2.3.2 The protocol
The protocol works as follows [16]. Let G be a public (semi)group, and let g ∈ G and
φ ∈ Aut(G) be public as well. Alice chooses a private integer m and Bob chooses a private
integer n.
(1) Alice computes (g, φ)m = (φm−1(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φm) and sends only the first component
to Bob; call that component a.
(2) Bob computes (g, φ)n = (φn−1(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φn) and sends only the first component to
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Alice; call it b.
(3) Alice computes (b, x) · (a, φm) = (φm(b) · a, x · φm). Her key is KA = φm(b) · a.
(4) Bob computes (a, y) · (b, φn) = (φn(a) · b, y · φn). His key is KB = φn(a) · b.
Since KA = (g, φ)
m+n = KB, Alice and Bob have a shared secret key.
Note that use of the ‘square-and-multiply’ method greatly reduces the computational
cost of implementing the protocol. The exact cost, however, depends on the platform group
being used.
2.4 Platforms used for the HKKS protocol
2.4.1 Multiplicative group of integers modulo p
A simple application of the HKKS protocol is to use the multiplicative group of integers
modulo a prime p. The public endomorphism φ is selected by choosing k > 1 so that for
each h ∈ (Z/pZ)×, we have φ)h) = hk. Note that if k is relatively prime to p−1, then φ is in
fact an automorphism. Alice and Bob choose private m,n as in the Diffie–Hellman protocol.
Note that if g ∈ (Z/pZ)×, then
(g, φ)m = (φm−1(g) · φm−2(g) · · ·φ(g) · g, φm)
= (gk
m−1 · gkm−2 · · · gk · g, φm)
= (gk
m−1+···+k+1, φm)
= (g
km−1
k−1 , φm).
So, Alice sends k
m−1
k−1 to Bob, and Bob sends
kn−1
k−1 to Alice. The shared secret key is the first
component of (g, φ)m+n which is g
km+n−1
k−1 .
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A direct attack of this protocol would have the adversary (generally referred to as Eve) try
to recover m,n. To acquire either, Eve has to recover k
m−1
k−1 from g
km−1
k−1 , and then recover m
from k
m−1
k−1 . This amounts to solving the discrete logarithm problem twice.
Instead, Eve can view this as an analog of the Diffie–Hellman problem: recover the
shared secret g
km+n−1
k−1 from the triple
(
g, g
km−1
k−1 , g
kn−1
k−1
)
. Since g, k are public, it is enough
to recover gk
m+n
from the triple (g, gk
m
, gk
n
). This is precisely the standard Diffie–Hellman
problem (see Definition 1).
This instantiation of the protocol is the equivalent of the classic Diffie–Hellman protocol,
so breaking the HKKS protocol for any cyclic group would imply breaking the Diffie–Hellman
protocol.
2.4.2 Matrices over a group ring
Another platform investigated in [16] uses a semigroup and an inner automorphism.
Definition 4. Let G be a group, written multiplicatively, and let R be a ring. The
(semi)group ring of G over R, written R[G], is the set of formal linear combinations of
elements of G with coefficients in R: ∑
g∈G
rig,
where ri ∈ R, and all but finitely many ri are zero.
The particular platform suggested by the authors in [16] is the semigroup G of 3 × 3
matrices over the group ring Z7[A5], where A5 is the alternating group on 5 elements. We
denote the semigroup by G = GL3(Z7[A5]).
The semigroup G is extended by an inner automorphism φH , which is conjugation by a
matrix H ∈ G, i.e. φH(M) = H−1MH. Both M and H are public. Note that for all M ∈ G
and for all integers k ≥ 1, φkH(M) = H−kMHk.
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In the semidirect product, exponentiating an element gives
(M,φH)
m = (φm−1H (M) · φm−2H (M) · · ·φH(M) ·M,φmH)
= (H−m+1MHm−1 · · ·H−2MH2 ·H−1MH,φmH)
= H−m(HM)m.
So, Alice sends the matrix H−m(HM)m to Bob, and Bob sends the matrix H−n(HM)n to
Alice; the shared secret key is H−(m+n)(HM)m+n.
Eve can try to recover private m from H−m(HM)m. This problem appears to be hard.
In the case that H = Id, we have the analog of the discrete logarithm problem over Z7[A5],
i.e. to recover m given M and Mm. Using statistical experiments, it was shown [26] that for
a random matrix M , that Mm are indistinguishable from random matrices.
Cryptanalysis
The security of this protocol is based on the assumption that, given M ∈ M3(F7[A5]),
H ∈ GL3(F7[A5]), A = H−m(HM)m and B = H−n(HM)n, it is hard to compute the matrix
H−n−m(HM)n+m.
In [30], Kreuzer, Myasnikov and Ushakov show that the above problem can be solved
using the fact that H is invertible. In fact, any solution to the system

LA = R
LH = HL
RHM = HMR
L is invertible
with unknown matrices L,R immediately gives the shared key as L−1BR. To solve the
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system, find a solution satisfying the first three equations, and check if L is invertible. With
high probability this process will lead to a solution in a small number of tries.
Another independent attack was described by Romankov in [46]. In particular, he shows
that the shared secret key can be computed in the case when the underlying (semi)group G
is a multiplicative subgroup of a finite-dimensional algebra A over a field F and the endo-
morphism φ is extended to an endomorphism of the underlying vector space V of A. We
describe the method below.
Using Gaussian elimination, find a maximal linearly independent subset L of the set
{a0, a1, . . . , ak, . . .}, where a0 = g, ak = φk−1(g) · · ·φ(g) · g for k ≥ 1. In fact, suppose
{a0, . . . , ak} is linearly independent but ak+1 can be presented as an F–linear combination
of the ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ k, i.e. ak+1 =
∑k
i=0 λiai with λi ∈ F. Suppose by induction that ak+j can
be written as an F–linear combination of the ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ k for every j ≤ t− 1, i.e.
ak+t−1 =
k∑
i=0
µiai, µi ∈ F.
Then
ak+t = φ(ak+t−1) · g
=
k∑
i=0
µiφ(ai) · g
=
k∑
i=0
µiai+1
= µkλ0a0 +
k−1∑
i=0
(µi + µkλi+1ai+1).
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Thus L = {a0, . . . , ak}. In particular, we can effectively compute
an =
k∑
i=0
ηiai, ηi ∈ F.
Then
am+n = φ
m(an) · am =
k∑
i=0
ηiφ
m(ai) · am =
k∑
i=0
ηiφ
i(am) · ai;
in particular we have the shared secret key K = am+n. Therefore, there is a polynomial-time
algorithm to find the shared secret key K from the public data.
In light of this, in [27], Kahrobaei, Lam and Shpilrain propose the following countermea-
sure to prevent this attack. Since the attack splits the public key A into a product of two
matrices which act as H−m and (HM)m, then if M is not invertible, the annihilator of HM ,
Ann(HM) := {K ∈M3(F7[A5]) | K ·HM = O}
(where O here denotes the zero matrix), is nontrivial. Since m,n > 0, then adding OA, OB ∈
Ann(HM) to the public keys A and B changes those keys, but not the shared key.
The idea behind this modification is that now A cannot be split into a product of two
matrices to move one to the left-hand side. However, in [10], Ding, Miasnikov and Ushakov
show this is incorrect and the same attack can be applied. Using the fact that the annihilator
CHAPTER 2. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE DH KEY EXCHANGE 15
is a left ideal and H is invertible, then any solution of the system

LA = R + Z
LH = HL
R ·HM = HM ·R
Z ·HM = O
L is invertible
with unknown matrices L,R, Z gives the shared secret key as the product L−1BR (it is
essential that H is invertible).
2.4.3 Matrices over a Galois field
In her PhD thesis [32], Ha Lam proposes a countermeasure to the attack described above
using a more complex endomorphism rather than an inner automorphism. This requires a
change of platform group; she uses matrices over a Galois, or finite, field. In particular, Lam
uses binary fields, which are finite fields of order 2m, denoted GF(2m). Binary fields are
widely used in cryptography, and well-studied algorithms make computation very fast. For
background on binary fields, we refer the reader to [32].
Lam suggests using the semigroup of 2 × 2 matrices over the Galois field GF(2t) as a
platform for the HKKS key exchange. In fact, she uses an extension of G by an endomor-
phism φ which is a composition of a conjugation by a matrix H ∈ GL2(GF(2t)) with the
endomorphism ψ which raises each entry of a given matrix to the power 4. We apply ψ first,
followed by conjugation. So, with public elements M and H, we have φ(M) = H−1ψ(M)H.
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So, for any M ∈ G and for all integers k ≥ 1,
φk(M) = φk−1(H−1ψ(M)H)
= φk−2(φ(H−1ψ(M)H)) = φk−2(H−1ψ(H−1φ2(M) · · ·ψ(H)H)
...
= H−1ψ(H−1 · · ·ψk−1(H−1)ψk(M)ψk−1(H) · · ·ψ(H)H.
Then the HKKS protocol works as follows.
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a degree k for the Galois field and public matrices M ∈ G and
H ∈ GL2(GF(2t)). Alice and Bob select their respective private positive integers m
and n.
(2) Alice computes (M,φ)m and sends the first component, A, to Bob.
(3) Bob computes (M,φ)n and sends the first component, B, to Alice.
(4) Alice’s secret key is KA = φ
m(B) · A, which is the first component of (M,φ)m+n.
Similarly, Bob’s secret key is KB = φ
n(A) · B, which is again the first component of
(M,φ)m+n.
Since KA = KB, this is the shared secret key K.
The security assumption of the protocol is that it is hard to recover K from the matrices
H,M,A,B with A and B as defined above. First, considering only φ = H−1MH, note
that in the simplest case (φ = Id) yields the analog of the discrete logarithm problem for
matrices over GF(2t), i.e. to recover m given M and Mm. Pollard’s rho method and Shank’s
baby-step-giant-step method are standard techniques for attacking the discrete logarithm
problem (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively), and are based on the difficulty of detecting
cycles. Here, looking for a cycle means finding i, j such that x−iyi = x−jyj, where x = H,
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y = HM . If x and y are both invertible, then this is really the problem of finding k such
that xk = yk, so instead of detecting a cycle, it is a problem of finding an intersection of two
independent cycles. This is apparently a more difficult problem.
Another possible attack involves the determinants of the public matrices H,M,A,B,
since recovering m can be reduced to the discrete log problem for (det(M), (det(M))n). To
prevent this attack, simply choose M to have determinant either 0 or 1.
The implementation with this platform group was to use GF(2127) and GF(2571). For
details on the efficiency, see [32].
Cryptanalysis
A similar attack as the one on this protocol using matrices over a group ring can be applied
here, as described by Ding, Miasnikov and Ushakov in [10]. Noting that the map x
τ7→ x4
defined on GF(2127) can be seen as a square of the Frobenius automorphism, and induces
the automorphism ψ of M2(GF(2127)) of order 127.
Recall that φ(M) = H−1ψ(M)H for all matrices M ∈ M2(GF(2127)), and for all k ∈ N,
we have
φk(M) =
k−1∏
i=0
ψi(H−1) · ψk(M) ·
0∏
i=k−1
ψi(M).
With φ given in this form, Alice’s public key A = φm−1(M) · · ·φ(M)M is of the form
(m−1∏
i=0
ψi(H−1) · ψm(M) ·
0∏
i=m−1
ψi(H)
)
·
(m−2∏
i=0
ψi(H−1) · ψm−1(M) ·
0∏
i=m−2
ψi(H)
)
· · ·H−1ψ(M)H ·M
=
(m−1∏
i=0
ψi(H−1) · ψm(M)
)
ψm−1(H)ψm−1(M) · psim−2(H)ψm−2(M)
· · ·ψ(H)ψ(M) ·HM
=
( m∏
i=0
ψi(H−1)
)
·
( 0∏
i=m
ψi(HM)
)
.
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Since |ψ| = 127, we can divide m = 127q + r and write Alice’s key as
A =
( 126∏
i=0
ψi(H−1)
)q
·
( r∏
i=0
ψi(H−1)
)
·
( 0∏
i=r
ψi(HM)
)
·
( 0∏
i=126
ψi(HM)
)q
.
Bob’s public key can be written similarly, using the fact that n = 127s+ t:
A =
( 126∏
i=0
ψi(H−1)
)s
·
( t∏
i=0
ψi(H−1)
)
·
( 0∏
i=t
ψi(HM)
)
·
( 0∏
i=126
ψi(HM)
)s
.
Now, for each 0 ≤ r ≤ 126, we can try to solve the system of equations

L · A = (∏ri=0 ψi(H−1)) · (∏0i=r ψi(HM)) ·R,
L ·∏126i=0 ψi(H−1) = ∏126i=0 ψi(H−1) · L,
R ·∏0i=126 ψi(HM) = ∏0i=126 ψi(HM) ·R,
L is invertible.
If the pair (L,R) satisfies the above system, then L−1BR is the shared key, i.e. the same
linear algebra attack does in fact work on the HKKS protocol using matrices over a Galois
field as the platform group.
Under the assumption of the linearity of the platform group, even the proposed improve-
ments by Lam are shown to be susceptible to the linear decomposition attack of Romankov
described in [46]. In contrast to the linear algebra attack described above, the linear decom-
position attack is fairly simple.
Consider the linear space W which is generated by all elements of the form Hk(HM)l,
where k, l ∈ N, with effectively computed basis e1, . . . , et (note that t ≤ 4.) Since every
matrix is a root of a characteristic polynomial of degree 2, one can choose basis elements of
the form ei = H
ki(HM)li , li ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , t. Then an, am can be effectively computed,
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and from this, one can effectively compute the shared secret key K = am+n.
Even when Lam describes an altered protocol to avoid the linear algebra attack, this
altered protocol is still vulnerable to the linear decomposition attack. Consider the linear
space W generated by elements of the form H−k(HM)k, and note that am, an ∈ W . Let U
denote the annihilator space of HM consisting of all matrices A ∈ M2(GF(2127)) such that
A · (HM) = 0. Note that Alice’s and Bob’s private matrices lie in U . Let Z = W + U
with basis {e1, . . . el, f1, . . . , ft} with ei ∈ W , fj ∈ U and ei = H−ki(HM)ki . Then one can
effectively compute an and hence the shared secret key K = am+n.
Note that in all instances of this cryptanalysis, the basis is constructed one time oﬄine,
and we do not need to look for an invertible solution to a system of linear equations. Note
also that we do not need to compute m and/or n to recover the shared secret key K.
On the other hand, this attack only works if an inner automorphism (or a minor variation
thereof) is used for extension of the platform (semi)group because otherwise, the long product
would not simplify to H−k(HM)k.
2.5 Burnside groups: a new platform for the HKKS
key exchange
In light of the recent attacks on Habeeb, Kahrobaei, Koupparis and Shpilrain’s and Lam’s
parameters, in this section we propose using Burnside groups as a platform for the HKKS
key-exchange protocol. We begin with background on Burnside groups, and outline why
they are a good choice for a platform group. We note that Burnside groups have been used
in [3] as platforms for a very different cryptographic protocol.
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2.5.1 Burnside groups
For a positive integer k, consider the class of groups for which all elements x satisfy xk = 1.
Such a group is said to be of exponent k. We consider the family of such groups called the
(free) Burnside groups of exponent k, which are in some sense the ‘largest.’ The Burnside
groups are determined by two parameters: the exponent k and the number of generators n,
and are denoted B(n, k).
Definition 5 ((Free) Burnside group). For any n, k ≥ 0, the Burnside group of exponent k
with n generators is defined as
B(n, k) = 〈{x1, . . . , xn}; {wk | for all words w over x1, . . . , xn}〉.
For our cryptographic purposes, it is important that B(n, k) be finite. The question of
whether a given Burnside group is finite is known as the Burnside problem. For sufficiently
large k, it is known that B(n, k) is infinite [22]. For small exponents, it is known that B(n, k)
is finite for k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 6}. With the exception of k = 2, these are nontrivial results. For
other small values of k, the question of finiteness remains open.
We are interested in Burnside groups of exponent 3. The main reasons are as follows:
k = 2 would give the more familiar (and already studied) case B(n, 2) =
⊕
n Z2; it is
convenient for k to be prime (hence eliminating k = 4 and k = 6); and perhaps most
importantly, the structure of B(n, 3) is much better understood in comparison to that of
k = 4, 6. Hence, in what follows we will deal only with B(n, 3) and denote it simply by Bn.
We will first review some important facts about Burnside groups. For more details we
refer the reader to [3].
Bn is free In the category of groups of exponent 3, Bn is a free object on the set of genera-
tors of size n. That is, if G is any group such that g3 = 1 for all g ∈ G, then for any set map
f : A → G (where A is a generating set) there exists a unique homomorphism f¯ : Bn → G
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such that f¯(xi) = f(xi) for every i ∈ [n]. In other words, to define a homomorphism from Bn
to G we need only define the function on A. Any such assignment will extend uniquely to a
group homomorphism.
From this we can compute that there are 3n
(
r+(r2)+(
r
3)
)
homomorphisms from Bn to Br.
Normal form It is known that Bn is nilpotent of class 3, meaning that the smallest possible
length of a central series for the group is 3. Even though Bn is nonabelian, each element
has a unique normal form, as result of the order law w3 = 1 for all w ∈ Bn. Precisely, each
element of Bn can be written as an ordered sequence of (a subset of) generators (or their
inverses1), appearing in lexicographical order, followed by (a subset of) the commutators of
weight 2 (or their inverses), and finally by (a subset of) the commutators of weight 3 (or
their inverses):
n∏
i=1
xαii
∏
i<j
[xi, xj]
βi,j
∏
i<j<k
[xi, xj, xk]
γi,j,k
where αi, βi,j, γi,j,k ∈ {0, 1,−1} for all 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n. Note that [xi, xj, xk] = [[xi, xj], xk].
From the above normal form, Bn has order 3
n+(n2)+(
n
3).
Abelianization of Bn It is also clear from the normal form that the abelianization
Bn/[Bn, Bn] of Bn is isomorphic to
⊕
n Z3, and the abelianization map ρ is efficiently com-
putable, as it amounts to taking a prefix of the exponent list from the normal form:
ρ :
n∏
i=1
xαii
∏
i<j
[xi, xj]
βi,j
∏
i<j<k
[xi, xj, xk]
γi,j,k ∈ Bn 7→ (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ Fn3 .
Center of Bn The center Z(Bn) = {g ∈ Bn | [g, h] = 1, for all h ∈ Bn} is the subgroup
[[Bn, Bn], Bn] generated by all commutators of weight 3. This follows in part from the fact
that Bn is nilpotent of nilpotency class 3, and thus all commutators of weight 4 are the
identity in Bn.
Diameter of Bn We also have the following lemma regarding the diameter of Bn:
1Note that x−1 = x2 in Bn, since Bn has exponent 3.
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Lemma 1. [3] There exists τn ∈ Bn such that ‖τn‖ ∈ Ω( n3logn), where ‖ · ‖ denotes length.
Proof. Let dn = maxx∈Bn(‖x‖), and recall that |Bn| = 3n+(
n
2)+(
n
3). Since all elements of the
group can be written with at most dn symbols taken from x
±1
1 , . . . , x
±1
n , we have
(2n)dn ≥ 3n+
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
3
)
⇐⇒ dn log3(2n) ≥ n+
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
3
)
⇐⇒ dn ≥
⌈
n+
(
n
2
)
+
(
n
3
)
log3 2n
⌉
.
This completes the proof.
2.6 Computational aspects of Bn
In order for the Burnside groups to be of use in cryptography, they must at least satisfy the
following: they must have a concise representation, and have efficiently computable group
operation. We demonstrate here that both criteria are met.
First, since each element of Bn has unique normal form as a product of the generators
and commutators of weights 2 and 3, it is enough to store an array of exponents (where each
exponent is either 0, 1,−1) to represent an element. The size of the array is cubic in n.
As for the group operation, this can be computed simply by concatenating two normal
forms, and then reducing the resulting word back into normal form. This process is called
the collection process. It takes cubic time (see [17, Chapter 11]) in the length of the in-
put.However, since Bn is nilpotent of class 3, all commutators of weight 3 are in the center
Z(Bn), and hence there is no need to expand them and apply the collection process: one
can simply add the corresponding exponents modulo 3. Furthermore, since all commutators
of weight 4 are trivial (see [17, Chapter 18]) we know that [Bn, Bn] is commutative. Hence,
we can again avoid the collection process when moving the weight–2 commutators amongst
themselves, and in cubic time, we can reduce the expression to a “nearly” normal form con-
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sisting of a product of at most 2n generators (or their inverses) followed by commutators in
normal form. Therefore we need only to apply the collection process on linear input, and so
the overall running time of computing the product is indeed O(n3).
Inverses can also be computed over Bn in at most cubic time by a similar (yet somewhat
simpler) collecting process.
The last and most challenging computational aspect of Bn relates to its geodesics : the
computation of distances in the Cayley graph. For the applications we introduce here, it will
suffice to compute the norm (i.e. the distance to the identity of the group).
In general, finding geodesics in the Cayley graph is a difficult problem. In some cases, it
is known to be NP–hard [37].2
However, this is not as troubling as it seems. We need only to compute norms in the
codomain group Pn, which is generally small, and does not necessarily grow with the security
parameter (although it may grow with a correctness parameter). For the case of the free
Burnside group Br, one possible solution is to perform a breadth-first search of the Cayley
graph, storing the norm of every element in a table. Around r = 5, the feasibility of this
process becomes questionable.
For the general case, geodesics in the Cayley graph of Bn might be efficiently computable
(perhaps up to small approximation factors) making use of a number of commutator identi-
ties, for instance:
[a, b] = [b, a]−1; a[a, b] = [a, b]a; [a, b]−1 = [a−1, b]; [a, b, c]−1 = [a−1, b, c].
This might allow one to either shorten the normal forms, or to first reorder the generators
and then notice that the resulting words are shorter. We shall not concern ourselves with
this here, but will consider this problem separately.
2One entertaining example is that of the Rubik’s cube group, whose diameter was demonstrated to be 20
in 2010 via a distributed computing project which required 35 CPU-years.
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To begin with, |B(n)| grows superexponentially with respect to n, so the size of the group
is large enough to prevent a brute force attack. Moreover, B(n) is relatively free, so every
self-map on the generators extends to a unique endomorphism. Perhaps more important to
this particular application is the fact that despite the relatively small order of the group,
there are group homomorphisms of superpolynomial order. We consider the homomorphism
corresponding to the following map of generators a1, a2, . . . , an:
ai 7→ ai+1, 1 ≤ i < n,
an 7→ a1an.
We will show experimental results related to this in Section 3.4.
The protocol using Burnside groups works the same as described in Section 2.3.2. The
efficiency of the computations (namely the cost of computing exponents) in B(n) is explored
in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Burnside groups as platform for
HKKS
In order for a group to be a suitable platform for the HKKS key exchange protocol, we at the
very least need to demonstrate that endomorphisms of that group do not have small order.
In this chapter, we will describe methods for determining a cycle or loop of a set map, as
well as methods of solving the discrete logarithm problem.
The discrete logarithm problem is of fundamental importance in public-key cryptography:
many commonly used cryptosystems are based on the assumption that the discrete logarithm
is difficult to compute. In this chapter, we describe some methods for solving the discrete
logarithm problem, in particular Pollard’s rho method in Section 3.2 and Shank’s baby-step,
giant-step algorithm in Section 3.3.
Finally, we will describe our experiments performed in GAP [14] in Section 3.4 which
show that the Burnside groups of exponent 3 are a good candidate for a platform for the
HKKS key exchange protocol.
25
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3.1 Cycle detection
Cycle detection is the problem of finding a cycle in a sequence of iterated function values.
For any finite set S, any initial value x0 ∈ S and any function f : S → S, the sequence
x0, x1 = f(x0), x2 = f(x1), . . . , xi = f(xi−1), . . .
must eventually use the same value twice.
Given f and x0 ∈ S, find i, j such that xi = xj. We will focus on group endomorphisms,
h : G→ G, where G is a finite group.
Let µ be the smallest index such that xµ appears infinitely often in the sequence {xi},
and let λ denote the smallest positive integer such that xµ = xλ+µ. In other words, µ is the
start of the loop and λ is the length of the loop. So we want to find a way to determine µ
and λ.
The na¨ıve approach to cycle detection is as follows. Given a group homomorphism
h : G → G, with G a finite group, and an element g ∈ G, we can store the elements of the
sequence {hi(g)} in a list. Then compare each new list element with all the previous ones,
looking for a repeat.
The problem with this method is that it is slow and uses a lot of memory. The space
complexity is maybe λ+ µ, which is unnecessarily large. Part of what is inefficient for some
groups is computing each power of h.
A technique that is often employed to increase efficiency in computation is the square-
and-multiply method. With this method, we precompute powers of h:
h, h2, h4, h8, . . . hblog2(|G|)c.
Then, for each m from the na¨ıve approach, square and multiply. For example, when m = 17,
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then we write m = 1 + 16 and so
h17 = h · h16.
This is now just the composition of two maps, which were already computed.
The main problem with square-and-multiply is that it does not really improve our memory
issues. For memory purposes, we would like to find µ and λ while examining as few values
from the sequence as possible.
We should develop a way to do this which uses significantly less memory than it would
take to store the entire sequence. Applying the equality test to each pair of values results in
quadratic time overall. We can do better.
Tortoise and hare
The tortoise and hare algorithm is a pointer algorithm, due to Robert W. Floyd, and was
developed in the late 1960’s [28].
There are two pointers: the tortoise (T) and the hare (H). They move at different speeds
through the sequence. We need only check for repeated values of the form
xi = x2i.
At each step, i increases by 1, so T moves forward 1 and H moves forward by 2. Then we
compare the sequence values at these pointers. The first thing we look for is the smallest
value i such that T=H.
Now, the position of T (the distance between T and H) is divisible by the length of the
cycle. So, H is moving in the cycle and T (set to g) is moving towards the cycle. They will
intersect at the beginning of the cycle. Call this point µ. We find the position of the first
repetition of length µ. Now T and H move at the same speed. (Note that H=h2i(g).)
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We now have µ, the beginning of the cycle. We now find the length of the shortest cycle
from xµ = h
µ(g). T stays still, H moves.
This algorithm only accesses the sequence by storing and copying pointers, functions
evaluations and equality tests. It uses O(λ+ µ) operations of these types, and O(1) storage
space.
3.2 Pollard’s ρ method
Pollard’s ρ algorithm for logarithms was introduced in 1978 [45]: the goal is to find γ such
that αγ = β, where β ∈ 〈α〉 =: G. Like the tortoise and hare algorithm, it is based
on Floyd’s cycle-finding algorithm [28]. The algorithm uses Floyd’s algorithm to compute
a, b, A,B such that αaβb = αAβB. Note that in the simplified case, if the underlying group
is cycle of order n, then γ is a solution to
(B − b)γ ≡ (a− A) (mod n).
To find a, b, A,B, use Floyd’s cycle-finding algorithm to find a cycle in the sequence xi =
αaiβbi , where the function f : xi 7→ xi+1 is assumed to be random-looking, and thus enter
into a loop after approximately
√
(pin)/2 steps. One way to define such a function is to
divide G into three disjoint subsets of approximately equal size: S0, S1, S2. If x is in S0, then
double both a and b; if x is in S1, increment a; if x is in S2, increment b.
Algorithm 3. Let G be a cyclic group of order p, let a, b ∈ G be given, let G = S0∪S1∪S2
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be a disjoint partition, and let f : G→ G be a map
f(x) =

βx x ∈ S0,
x2 x ∈ S1,
αx x ∈ S2.
Then define maps g, h : G× Z→ Z by
g(x, n) =

n x ∈ S0,
2n (mod p) x ∈ S1,
n+ 1 (mod p) x ∈ S2,
h(x, n) =

n+ 1 (mod p) x ∈ S0,
2n (mod p) x ∈ S1,
n x ∈ S2.
The algorithm takes as input a generator a of G and an element b of G. The output is an
integer x such that ax = b, or failure. The following pseudocode describes how to find x:
(1) Initialize
a0 ← 0,
b0 ← 0,
x0 ← 1 ∈ G,
i← 1.
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(2) Define
xi ← f(xi−1),
ai ← g(xi−1, ai−1),
bi ← H(xi−1, ai−1),
and
x2i ← f(f(x2i−2)),
a2i ← g(f(x2i−2, g(x2i−2), a2i−2)),
b2i ← h(f(x2i−2, h(x2i−2), a2i−2))
(3) If xi = x2i, then
(a) r ← bi − b2i,
(b) if r = 0, return ‘failure’,
(c) x← r−1(a2i − ai) (mod p),
(d) return x.
(4) If xi 6= x2i, then i = i+ 1 and return to step 2.
The running time is approximately O(
√
p), where p is n’s largest prime factor.
3.3 Baby-step, giant-step
Shank’s baby-step, giant-step algorithm is a method for computing the discrete logarithm of
an integer h not divisible by p with respect to a primitive root g modulo p. When employed
correctly, it is significantly faster than the brute-force method of checking all p − 1 powers
of g modulo p and checking which power matches h.
The idea is this: let m = d√pe. If the discrete logarithm of h is x, then we can write
x = mq + r for some integers q, r such that 0 ≤ r < m. Then
h ≡ gx = gmqgr (mod p),
which means that h(g−m)q ≡ gr (mod p). The strategy then is to compute the m numbers
1, g, g2, . . . , gm−1 modulo p, and then compute g−m modulo p. Then we start computing
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h(g−m)q modulo p for q = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At some point, we will have a collision with the first
list produced, i.e. we will find some q such that h(g−m)q ≡ gr (mod p) for some 0 ≤ r < m.
Once this collision is found, the discrete logarithm we are looking for is mq + r.
Example. Let p = 31 and g = 3 (note that 3 is a primitive root modulo 31). Let us compute
the discrete logarithm of h = 6.
We have m = d√31e = 6, and compute 1, g, g2, . . . , g5 modulo 31:
g0 = 1, g1 = 3, g2 = 9, g3 = 27, g4 = 19, g5 = 26.
We also compute g−m = 3−6 (mod 31) ≡ 216 ≡ 2 (mod 31), and then start computing
h(g−m)q = 6 · 2q for increasing values of q:
h(g−m)0 = 6 · 20 = 6,
h(g−m)1 = 6 · 21 = 12,
h(g−m)2 = 6 · 22 = 24,
h(g−m)3 = 6 · 23 ≡ 17,
h(g−m)4 = 6 · 24 ≡ 3,
and we’ve found a collision: h(g−m)4 ≡ g1 (mod p). This means that
h ≡ g4m+1 = g25,
so 25 is the discrete logarithm we seek.
Let’s consider the number of operations this algorithm requires. To begin with, we need to
compute m different powers of g, which means m multiplications. To compute g−m modulo p,
after we invert, we can use the square-and-multiply method to raise g−1 to the mth power in
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log(m) steps. Then we need to compute h(g−m)q for various values of q. Since x = mq + r,
we have q = x−r
m
≤ x
m
≤ p√
p
=
√
p ≤ m, so at worst we will need to compute up to q = m.
But for each of these, in addition to the multiplication, we also have to search the original
list of m elements. We can use a binary search to do this in log(m) comparisons. So at
worst, we need to do m log(m) multiplications and comparisons as we compute h(g−m)q to
look for collisions. So we end up with at worst m + 1 + log(m) + m log(m) multiplications,
inversions and comparisons, which is O(m log(m)). Since m is O(
√
p), then m log(m) is
O(
√
p log(
√
p)) = O(
√
p log(p)). This is obviously faster than the na¨ıve brute-force approach,
which is O(p).
3.4 Experimental results
Recall that since we are only considering Burnside groups of exponent 3, we use the nota-
tion Bn where n is the number of generators. Recall also that a set map on the generators
of Bn extends uniquely to an endomorphism, so we can fully describe a homomorphism on Bn
by how it maps the generators x1, x2, . . . , xn.
We began by computing the order of all homomorphisms of Bn for small values of n, and
discovered that the map φn given by
xi 7→ xi+1 1 ≤ i < n, xn 7→ x1xn,
gave a homomorphism of a large order. Note that here we are using the term order rather
loosely, as what we really mean is cycle, i.e. find i, j such that φin = φ
j
n. If φn is an
automorphism then it is the special case of cycle detection with i = 1.
We soon realized that the order of the above-described map grows very quickly as n
grows. Enlisting a supercomputer through the CUNY High Performance Computing Cen-
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ter1 computing the order of these homomorphisms using GAP was inefficient, even with
parallelization. For ease of computation, we shifted our focus to the abelianization of Bn,
that is, Bn “modded out by the commutators:” this allowed us to work with n× n matrices
over Z3. Then any homomorphism φ over Bn corresponds to one in this abelianization. If
we can show a lower bound “big enough” here, then it extends back to Bn, since the order
of the matrix representation of φ will divide the order of the homomorphism φ. For our
particular map φn, let Mn denote the corresponding n× n matrix.
We computed that the order of the matrix corresponding to φ22, which is denoted by
M22, is 15, 625, 959, 602, and the order of the matrix corresponding to φ24, denoted M24, is
10, 460, 353, 202. Putting these together in a 46× 46 block matrix
M :=
M22 0
0 M24
 ,
we see that |M | = lcm(M22,M24) > 265, where |M |
∣∣ |φ46.
These computations were done with an Intel Core i5 dual-core 2.5 GHz processor and 4
GB of RAM running Ubuntu Linux version 14.10, running GAP version 4.7.5.
As far as the computation time, we averaged about 0.081 seconds per multiplication,
without any optimization and using GAP. This is slower than ideal. Moreover, as we are
working with matrices, the linear algebra attacks described in Section 2.4 apply here. How-
ever, if we instead use φ46 as the homomorphism for the semidirect product in the protocol,
then known attacks do not work.
1The CUNY HPCC is operated by the College of Staten Island and funded, in part, by grants from the
City of New York, State of New York, CUNY Research Foundation, and National Science Foundation Grants
CNS-0958379, CNS-0855217 and ACI 1126113.
Chapter 4
Hashing with Matrices
Along with key exchange, a very important cryptographic primitive is the hash function.
Cryptographic hash functions have many applications to information security, including
digital signatures and methods of authentication. They can also be used as ordinary hash
functions, to index data in a hash table, fingerprinting (a procedure which maps an arbitrary
large data item to a shorter bitstring, or fingerprint which uniquely identifies the original data
for all practical purposes), to detect duplicate data and as checksums to detect (accidental)
data corruption. In fact, in the context of information security, cryptographic hash values
are often referred to as fingerprints, checksums, or just hash values.
In this chapter we will first define the hash function and explain some properties we
require a hash function to possess. Then we introduce Cayley hash functions, which are a
family of hash functions based on nonabelian groups. We then explore hashing with matrices,
and propose using matrices over SL2(Fp) of a particular form which generate Fp.
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4.1 Background
In this section we introduce the definition and the main properties of cryptographic hash
functions. Hash functions are fundamental to cryptographic protocols, particularly useful in
digital signature schemes and message authentication. A hash function is a function that
maps a bitstring of an arbitrarily long length to a fixed (small) length bitstring. Additionally,
we require the function to be collision resistant, second preimage resistant and preimage
resistant.
Definition 6. Let n ∈ N and let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n such that m 7→ h = H(m). We
require a hash function to satisfy the following:
(1) preimage resistance: given output y, it is hard to find input x such that H(x) = y;
(2) second preimage resistance: given input x1, it is hard to find another input x2 6= x1
such that H(x1) = H(x2);
(3) collision resistance: it is hard to find inputs x1 6= x2 such that H(x1) = H(x2).
Note that since hash functions are not injective, this ‘uniqueness’ that we desire is purely
computational. From a practical perspective, this means that no big cluster of computers
can find the input based only on the output of a hash function.
There exist old hash function constructions whose collision resistance follows from the
hardness of number-theoretic or group-theoretic problems. However, these hash functions
can only be used in applications which require only collision resistance and are often too
slow for practical purposes. Standardized hash functions, such as the SHA family, follow
the block cipher design: their use is not restricted to collision resistance, but their collision
resistance is heuristic and not established by any precise mathematical problem. In fact,
recent attacks against the SHA-1 algorithm have led to a competition for a new Standard
hash Algorithm [40].
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Another direction, more relevant to our work, is the expander hash function, dating back
to 1991 when Ze´mor proposed building a hash function based on the special linear group.
This first attempt was quickly broken, but Tillich and Ze´mor quickly proposed a second
function which was resistant to the attack on the first; see [52]. However, as we will describe,
this newer hash function is also vulnerable to attack; see Section 4.2.1. The Tillich–Ze´mor
hash function is a type of expander hash called a Cayley hash function, and is different from
functions in the SHA family in that it is not a block hash function, but rather each bit is
hashed individually. We discuss this particular hash function in further detail in Section 4.2.
The expander hash design is fundamentally different from classical hash designs in that it
allows for relating important properties of hash functions such as collision resistance, preim-
age resistance (see Definition 6) and their output distribution to the graph-theoretical notions
of cycle, girth and expanding constants. When the graphs used are Cayley graphs, the design
additionally provides efficient parallel computation and group-theoretical interpretations of
the hash properties.
The expander hash design, though not so new anymore, is still little understood by the
cryptographic community. The Tillich–Ze´mor hash function is often considered broken be-
cause of existing trapdoor attacks and attacks against specific parameters. In fact, relations
between hash, graph and group-theoretic properties have been sketched but no precise state-
ments on these problems exist. Since the mathematical problems which underly the security
of expander hashes do not belong to classical problems, it appears as though they have not
been investigated. Hence their actual hardness is unknown. Efficiency aspects have also only
been sketched.
The goal of the work on hash functions in this thesis is to establish new (Cayley) hash
functions which are resistant to known attacks, and demonstrate their computational effi-
ciency.
Cayley hash functions are based on the idea of using a pair of (semi)group elements, A
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and B, to hash the 0 and 1 bit, respectively, and then to hash an arbitrary bitstring by using
multiplication of elements in the (semi)group. We focus on hashing with 2 × 2 matrices
over Fp. Since there are many known pairs of 2 × 2 matrices over Z which generate a
free monoid, this yields numerous pairs of matrices over Fp (for p sufficiently large) that
are candidates for collision-resistant hashing. However, this trick can backfire and allow
for a lifting of matrix elements to Z to find a collision. This “lifting attack” was used by
Tillich and Ze´mor [52] in the case where two matrices A and B generate (as a monoid)
all of SL2(Z+). We will show that with other, ‘similar’ pairs of matrices from SL2(Z), the
situation is different, and while the same “lifting attack” can (in some cases) produce collision
in the group generated by A and B, it says nothing about the monoid generated by A and B.
Since we only use positive powers for hashing, this is all we need, and we argue that for these
pairs of matrices, there are no known attacks at this time that would affect the security of
the corresponding hash functions.
Additionally, we give lower bounds on the length of collisions for hash functions corre-
sponding to some particular pairs of matrices from SL2(Fp).
4.1.1 Cayley hash functions
Classical hash functions mix pieces of the message repeatedly so the result appears sufficiently
random [44]. For this reason, they may be unappealing outside the area of cryptography.
On the other hand, a particular type of expander hash function, the Cayley hash function,
has a more straightforward design.
Given a group G and a subset S = {s1, . . . , sk} of G, their Cayley graph G is a k–regular
graph that has a vertex vg associated to each element of G and an edge between vertices vg1
and vg2 if there exists si ∈ S such that g2 = g1si.
To build a hash function from the Cayley graph, let σ : {1, . . . , k} → S be an ordering, fix
an initial value g0 and write the message m as a string m1m2 · · ·mN , where mi ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
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Then the hash value is H(m) := g0σ(m1) · · ·σ(mN). This is represented on the Cayley graph
as a (nonbacktracking) walk; the endpoint of the walk is the hash value.
Two texts yielding the same hash value correspond to two paths with the same start and
endpoints. We would like those two paths to differ necessarily by a “minimum amount”.
Such a vague notion can be guaranteed if there are no short cycles in the Cayley graph.
More precisely, we want the Cayley graph to have a large girth:
Definition 7. The directed girth of a Cayley graph G is the largest integer ∂ such that,
given any two vertices u and v, any pair of distinct paths which joins u to v will be such
that one of those paths has length (i.e. number of edges) ∂ or more.
The idea is that the girth of the Cayley graph is a relevant parameter to hashing. More
precisely, if a Cayley graph has a large girth ∂, then the corresponding hash function will
have the property that small modifications of the text will modify the hash value [52].
One of the main advantages of Cayley hash functions over classical hash functions is their
ability to be parallelized. Namely, if messages x and y are concatenated, then the hashed
value of xy is H(xy) = H(x)H(y). Associativity of the group means we can break down
a large message into more manageable pieces, hash each piece, and then recover the final
result from the partial products.
Finally, a desirable feature of any hash function is the equidistribution of the hashed
values. This property can be guaranteed if the associated Cayley graph satisfies the following
property.
Proposition 1. [53, Proposition 2.3] If the Cayley graph of a group G is such that the
greatest common divisor of its cycle lengths equals 1, then for the corresponding hash function,
the distribution of hashed values of texts of length n tends to equidistribution when n tends
to infinity.
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This proposition is proved using classical graph-theoretic techniques, by studying succes-
sive powers An of the adjacency matrix of the graph. Equidistribution can be achieved with
graphs that have a high expansion coefficient (see [54]).
The collision, second preimage and preimage resistance of classical hash functions easily
translates to group-theoretic problems.
Definition 8. Let G be a group and let S = {s1, . . . , sk} ⊂ G be a generating set. Let
L ∈ Z be ‘small.’
(1) Balance problem Find an “efficient” algorithm that returns two words m = m1 · · ·m`
and m′ = m′1 · · ·m′`′ with `, `′ < L, mi,m′i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
∏
smi =
∏
sm′i .
(2) Representation problem Find an “efficient” algorithm that returns a word m1 · · ·m`
with ` < L, mi ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
∏
smi = 1.
(3) Factorization problem Find an “efficient” algorithm that, given any element g ∈ G,
returns a word m1 · · ·m` with ` < L, mi ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
∏
smi = g.
Note that since the group is finite, the length restriction is required, since for every w ∈ G,
w|G| = 1. Note also that Lubotzky described the factorization problem as a noncommutative
analog of the discrete logarithm problem [33]. In fact, if we omit trivial solutions, then the
representation and factorization problems are equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem
in abelian groups.
In general, the factorization problem is at least as hard as the representation problem,
which is itself at least as hard as the balance problem.
It is apparent that a Cayley hash function is collision resistant if and only if the balance
problem is hard, second preimage resistant if and only if the representation problem is hard,
and preimage resistant if and only if the factorization problem is hard.
Among all Cayley hash proposals, the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function is the only remaining
current candidate. (We will propose later in this chapter a similar hash function which is
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resistant to known attacks on parameters of the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function.) In general,
the security of Cayley hashes depends on the hardness in general of the factorization problem,
which remains a big open problem.
The efficiency of Cayley hashes depends on specific parameters: the Tillich–Ze´mor hash
function is the most efficient expander hash, but it is still 10 to 20 times slower than the
standard classical hash SHA. Computation in Cayley hashes can be easily parallelized, which
could be a major benefit in applications. In this chapter we propose a hash function based on
the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function which is resistant to known methods of attack, and which
is efficient in computation.
4.1.2 Possible attacks
The mathematical structure of Cayley hash functions leaves them vulnerable to attacks
which exploit this structure.
An important category of attack is the subgroup attack. A probabilistic attack was devised
by Camion [6], based on the search for text whose hashcode falls into a subgroup.
A second important category of attack is the lifting attack. Let us illustrate how a
lifting attack works with an example. Let G = SL(2,Fp). There is a natural map, the
reduction modulo p map, from SL(2,Z) to SL(2,Fp). A lifting attack for SL(2,Fp) will ‘lift’
the generators of SL(2,Z) and then try to ‘lift’ the element to be factored on the subgroup
of SL(2,Z) generated by the lifts of the generators. Generally, if a factorization exists, it is
easier to find over Z rather than over Fp, since properly chosen generators of an infinite group
will give us unique factorization. Once a factorization over Z has been obtained, reducing
modulo p provides a factorization over Fp. The most difficult part of the lifting attack is the
lifting itself.
We will explore later how this lifting works in particular cases. In particular we will
examine the first Cayley hash function proposed by Tillich and Ze´mor [52]. They chose
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G = SL(2, Fp) with generating set
S =

1 1
0 1
 ,
1 0
1 1

 .
The problem is that this group actually generates all of SL(2,Z+). Using the Euclidean
algorithm, factorizations in this infinite group are computed easily. We will propose a simple
modification of the generators which counters the lifting attack.
4.2 The Tillich–Ze´mor hash function
Hashing with matrices refers to the idea of using a pair of matrices, A and B (over a finite
ring) to hash the “0” bit and the “1” bit, respectively. Then, an arbitrary bit string is
hashed by using multiplication of matrices. So, the bit string 1001101 is hashed to the
matrix BA2B2AB.
One way to help ensure the requirements of Definition 6 is to use a pair of elements, A
and B, of a semigroup S such that the Cayley graph of the semigroup generated by A and B
is an expander graph. The most popular implementation of this idea is the Tillich–Ze´mor
hash function [53].
The use of the special linear group SL2(Fp) of 2× 2 matrices with determinant 1 over a
finite field Fp is a promising choice for devising hash functions. To begin with, we can choose
simple matrices as generators, which yields a fast hash: multiplication by such a matrix
amounts to a few additions in Fp. Cayley graphs over SL2(Fp) also have good expanding
properties; see Sarnak [48], Lafferty and Rockmore [31], and Margulis [34, 35].
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4.2.1 An efficient attack on the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function
In this section we will outline the attack described in [52]. For the hash function defined using
the above matrices A(1) and B(1), we can obtain collisions by looking for short factorizations
of the identity into a product of A(1)’s and B(1)’s in SL(2,Fp). Note the following.
Proposition 2 ([52]). The matrices
A(1) =
1 1
1 0
 and B(1) =
1 0
1 1

freely generate the monoid
M =
{
M =
a b
c d
 ∣∣∣∣ a, b, c, d ∈ N, ad− bd = 1}.
Moreover, there is an explicit algorithm which factorizes any matrix of M into a product
of A(1)’s and B(1)’s and runs in a logarithmic number of steps in max(a, b, c, d).
In fact, the algorithm alluded to in the above proposition is the euclidean algorithm
applied to the pair (a, b) if a + b > c + d, and to (c, d) otherwise. In fact, if a + b > c + d,
a > b and the number of steps for the euclidean algorithm to terminate, n, is even, then we
have the factorization a b
c d
 = A(1)qnB(1)qn−1 · · ·A(1)q2B(1)q1 ,
where qi is the i
th quotient that appears in the application of the algorithm.
Similarly, if c+ d > a+ b and the number of steps it takes for the euclidean algorithm to
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terminate, n, is odd, then we have the factorization
a b
c d
 = B(1)qnA(1)qn−1 · · ·A(1)q2B(1)q1 ,
where the qi are the quotients that appear in the algorithm.
Now we have the following strategy for an attack. First, find a matrix of the form
M =
1 + k1p k2p
k3p 1 + k4p

in SL(2,Z), with nonnegative coefficients, which reduces to the identity modulo p. Then use
the euclidean algorithm (on (a, b) if a+ b > c+ d and on (c, d) otherwise) to factor M into a
product of A(1)’s and B(1)’s over SL(2,Z). Reducing modulo p, this leads to a factorization
of the identity in SL(2,Fp).
The first question to answer is whether there exists such an M which is nontrivial. To
this end, we must find four integers k1, k2, k3, k4, not all 0, which correspond to the matrix M
having determinant 1. In other words, we must solve the diophantine equation
(1 + k1p)(1 + k4p)− k2pk3p = 1. (4.1)
To avoid the factorization being too long, we want all ki of roughly the same order of
magnitude. To do this, we outline the algorithm described in [52].
Algorithm 4. Choose a small integer c. Search for a solution (k1, k2, k3, k4) such that
k1 + k4 = cp. To obtain this, choose a random prime p
′ of roughly the same magnitude as p,
and take k3 = p
′. Now (4.1) becomes
k2p
′ = c+ cpk1 − k21. (4.2)
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This is possible if we can solve k21 − cpk1 − c = 0 (mod p′), i.e., the discriminant c2p2 + 4c
must be a quadratic residue modulo p′. With high probability, such a pair (c, p′) will be
found, giving us the following solution:
k1 =
cp+
√
c2p2 + 4c
2
,
k2 =
c+ cpk1 − k21
p′
,
k3 = p
′,
k4 = cp− k1.
In k1, we take the square root modulo p
′.
These solutions (k1, k2, k3, k4) are generally of order O(p), which yields a matrix M of
order O(p2).
Let us now illustrate how the algorithm works with a simple example.
Example. Let p = 7 and take c = 1. Then c2p2 + 4c = 53, which is a quadratic residue
modulo 11 =: p′. Then, using the above formula for finding the integers k1, k2, k3, k4, we get
k1 = 5, k2 = 1, k3 = 11, k4 = 2.
This corresponds to the matrix
M =
36 7
77 15
 .
Applying the euclidean algorithm to the pair (77, 15), we get quotients q1 = 5, q2 = 7, q3 = 2.
We can factor M as a product of A(1)’s and B(1)’s as
M =
36 7
77 15
 = B2A7B5 ≡
1 0
0 1
 (mod 7).
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This lifting attack allows for collision in the hash function, thus violating one of the
conditions we require.
4.3 Hashing with G = SL(2,Fp)
Another idea is to use A and B over Z which generate a free monoid, and then reduce the
entries modulo a large prime p to get matrices over Fp. Here we have a lower bound on the
length of bit string where a collision may occur, since there cannot be an equality of positive
products of A and B unless at least one of the entries in at least one of the products is at
least p. We will show precisely what this bound is, but it is on the order of log p.
In this section we investigate the Cayley graphs of SL(2,Fp) generated by
A(n) =
1 n
0 1
 , B(n) =
1 0
n 1
 ,
where n = 2, 3, respectively, and p is a large prime. Particularly, we show their application
to hashing.
The main difference is the difference between the group generated by A(n) and B(n) and
the monoid generated by A(n) and B(n).
4.3.1 The base case
A pair of matrices over Z which generate a free monoid is
A(1) =
1 1
1 0
 , B(1) =
1 0
1 1
 .
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Note that these matrices as generators of the group SL(2,Fp) have a Cayley graph which
forms an expander, so they are good candidates for the basis of a hash function. Note also
that these matrices are invertible and thus actually generate the group SL(2,Z). This group
is not free, but the monoid generated by A(1) and B(1) is free. Since only positive powers
are used in hashing, this is all we need.
However, since A(1) and B(1) generate all of SL(2,Z), we can use a lifting attack on
the corresponding hash function: a collision is found using the Euclidean algorithm on the
entries of a matrix; see Section 4.2.1. In short, it is readily seen that a short factorization of
the identity over SL(2,Fp) produces collisions. To find such a factorization, the strategy is to
reduce the problem to factoring in an infinite group; in this case, the group SL(2,Z). Find
a matrix U in SL(2,Z) which reduces modulo p to the identity, and which can be expressed
as a product of A(1)’s and B(1)’s. In this case, that means that we only require U to have
nonnegative coefficients. Then we use the Euclidean algorithm, which is an efficient way to
obtain the factorization of U .
For this attack to be effective, there must be a way of finding such a matrix U . Tillich
and Ze´mor [52] describe a probabilistic algortihm which does this. It is based on the fact
that the set of matrices of SL(2,Z) with nonnegative coefficients is ‘dense.’
To protect against such attacks, one should choose a set of generators that generate a
sufficiently sparse submonoid of the infinite group associated with SL(2,Fp). Tillich and
Ze´mor proposed using the matrices
A =
α 1
1 0
 , B =
α α + 1
1 1
 ,
where computations are made in the quotient field F2n = F2/〈p(x)〉, where p(x) has degree n,
and α is a root of p. See [53] for details on the imnplementation of this hash.
CHAPTER 4. HASHING WITH MATRICES 47
Tillich and Ze´mor use matrices A,B from the group SL(2, R), where R is a commutative
ring defined by R = F2[x]/(p(x)). They took p(x) to be the irreducible polynomial x131 +
x7 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x+ 1 over F2[x]. Thus, R is isomorphic to F2n , where n is the degree of
the irreducible polynomial p(x). Then, the matrices A and B are
A =
1 1
1 0
 , B =
1 0
1 1
 .
4.3.2 Efficient attacks
This hash function was published in 1994 [53], but there have been several recent attacks. In
2010, Petit and Quisquater [42] describe a preimage attack; in 2011, Grassl, Ilic, Magliveras
and Steinwandt [15] describe a collision attack.
Collision attack
In 2011, Grassl, Ilic´, Magliveras and Steinwandt [15] provided a method describing a way
to obtain collision. They develop some results on collisions between palindromic bitstrings
and combine these with a result of Mesirov and Sweet. This reduces the identification of
collisions for the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function to a linear algebra problem which can be easily
solved using a computer algebra system.
First, they show that the search for collisions for the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function can
be transferred to the search for collisions when new, specific generators c0 := A and c1 :=
A−1BA are used instead of A and B. In other words, finding collisions for the Tillich–Ze´mor
scheme is equivalent to finding collisions for the hash function h corresponding to C0 and C1.
Then, working inside the group SL2(F2[x]) of unimodular matrices over the polynomial
ring F2[x], define matrices C0 =
(
x 1
1 0
)
and C1 =
(
x+1 1
1 0
)
, and denote the corresponding hash
function by H. They then apply H to the subset of palindromic bitstrings, and conclude
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that if v is a palindromic bitstring, and H(v) =
(
a b
c d
)
, then b = c, deg(a) = |v| and
max{deg(b), deg(d)} ≤ |v|. (The proof is by induction on the length |v| of v.)
Next, examine the function ρ given by ρ(v) = H(0v0) + H(1v1). We are interested in
evaluating ρ modulo a given irreducible polynomial, because we ρ(v) ≡ ( 0 00 0 ) (mod q(x))
if and only if h(0v0) = h(1v1) is in fact a collision in SL2(F2[x]/(q(x))). Notice that if v
is a palindrome of length |v|, then ρ(v) = ( a aa 0 ), where a ∈ F2[x] has degree |v|, and that
moreover, a is the upper left entry of H(v).
For their attack, they care only about palindromes of even length, i.e. ones that can be
written in the form vvr for some bitstring v (vr denotes the “reversal” of v). In the case of
palindromes of even length, we have that H(v) =
(
a2 b
b d2
)
for some a, b, d ∈ F2[x].
Combining these results, if v is a palindrome of even length, then ρ(v) =
(
a2 a2
a2 0
)
for some
a ∈ F2[x] with deg(a) = |v|2 . (Note that a2 is the upper left entry of H(v).)
Using the above facts, we can derive the recurrence relation that for a given palindrome
v := bn · · · b1b1 · · · bn of length 2n, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the square root pi of the upper left entry of
H(v) is given by
pi

1 i = 0,
x+ b1 + 1 i = 1,
(x+ bi)pi−1 + pi−2 1 < i ≤ n.
Now, for the given irreducible polynomial q(x) ∈ F2[x] of degree n, we seek a palindrome v of
length 2n such that ρ(v) = H(0v0) +H(1v1) is the zero matrix in SL2(F2[x]/(q(x))). To do
this, determine a second polynomial p(x) ∈ F2[x] of degree n−1 such that gcd(q(x), p(x)) = 1,
and such that during the execution of the euclidean algorithm on (q(x), p(x)), the successive
quotients are all of degree 1, and the degree of each remainder is only one less than the
degree of the respective divisor. This will ensure we have a “euclidean algorithm chain” of
maximal length. The existence of such a polynomial p(x) is due to a result of Mesirov and
CHAPTER 4. HASHING WITH MATRICES 49
Sweet.
Once a polynomial p(x) has been found, the linear quotients x+ βi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ocurring
in the euclidean algorithm allow us to derive the bits bi in the above recurrence relation.
Notice that p1 = x + b1 + 1 and b=βi for i > 1, i.e. βi needs to be inverted; we denote this
inversion by βˆi. We therefore obtain the desired collision
h(0βn · · · βˆ1βˆ1 · · · βn0) = h(1βn · · · βˆ1 ˆbeta1 · · · βn1).
Note that once we have a palindrome collision, we immediately get a different (nonpalin-
dromic) collision with bitstrings of the same length, since for a palindrome v, we have that
h(0v0) = h(1v1) if and only if h(0v1) = h(1v0).
For the parameters given by Tillich and Ze´mor, that is, using the platform group
SL2(F2[x]/(x127 + x+ 1)),
they obtained two bitstrings v1, v2 of length n with h(0viv
r
i 0) = h(1v1v
r
11), i.e. two collisions
of bitstrings of length 2n+ 2 are obtained.
Preimage attack
Working on results introduced by Grassl et al in 2009, Petit and Quiaquater presented two
algorithms for computing preimages of the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function. First, they show
that a small modification of Grassl et al’s algorithm provides a second preimage algorithm.
Then they reduce the problem of finding preimages to any hash value to the problem of
precomputing preimages to a few hash values with certain characteristics; see [42, Section 4]
for details.
Finally, they provide two algorithms for the precomputing part, each with their own
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advantages depending on the user’s approach. The first algorithm produces shorter preim-
ages and is therefore more interesting from a practical perspective. The second algorithm is
deterministic, and faster than the first algorithm. Theoretically it may also be more inter-
esting, as there is a proof of success in deterministic cubic time for a(n important) subset of
parameters. The authors point out that although the Tillich–Ze´mor hash function has been
successfully broken, other hash functions based on a similar design could remain secure to
these attacks.
4.3.3 Hashing with A(2) and B(2)
In this section, we discuss circuits in the Cayley graph of SL(2,Fp) with generating set
A(2), B(2). Note that these matrices also correspond to a Cayley graph which forms an
expander graph.
We begin by noting that the lifting attack on the hash function depending on A(1)
and B(1) described above is the only published attack on that hash function. We will show
that this particular attack does not work with A(2), B(2). In particular, this gives evidence
of the security of using these matrices for hashing over Fp for a large prime p.
First we need to justify why these matrices are better candidates than A(1) and B(1).
Recall that when considered as matrices over Z, A(1) and B(1) generate (as a monoid) the
entire monoid of 2× 2 matrices over Z with positive entries, SL(2,Z+).
However, this is not the case with A(2) and B(2). We combine the following results of
Sanov [47] into a single theorem.
Theorem 1. (1) The group generated by
A(2) =
1 2
1 0
 , B(2) =
1 0
2 1
 ,
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is a free group.
(2) The subgroup of SL(2,Z) generated by A(2) and B(2) consists of all invertible matrices
of the form 1 + 4m1 2m2
2m3 1 +m4
 , (∗)
where the mi are integers.
Proof. (1) We will construct an action which satisfies the conditions of the Ping-pong
Lemma, which says that if G acts on a set X, and a, b ∈ G, C,D ⊆ X are such that
neither C nor D are contained in the other, and further that bn(C) ⊆ D and an(D) ⊆ C
for all nonzero integers n, then the subgroup of G generated by a and b is a free group with
{a, b} as a freely generating set. (In our notation, A(2) = a,B(2) = b,G = SL2(Z).)
To this end, let X = Z2 with SL2(Z) acting on it the usual way, that is, by matrix
multiplication with column vectors. Consider the subsets
C = {(x, y) | |y| > |x|}, C = {(x, y) | |y| < |x|}.
It is clear that A and B are nonempty disjoint sets. To see (A(2))n(C) ⊆ D for n 6= 0,
suppose that (x, y) ∈ Z2 such that |y| < |x|. Then (A(2))n(x, y) = (x, 2nx + y). Since
|x| > |y|, |2nx+y| > |2n||x|−|y| ≥ 2|x|−|y| = |x|+(|x|−|y|) > |x|. By a similar argument,
we have that (B(2))n(D) ⊆ C for n 6= 0.
We can now apply the Ping-pong Lemma, and conclude that the subgroup of SL2(Z)
generated by A(2) and B(2) is free.
(2) To see that an element of 〈A(2), B(2)〉 can written in the form (∗), notice that
the set S of invertible matrices of form (∗) forms a subgroup of SL2(Z). In particular, if
M =
(
a b
c d
) ∈ S, then clearly M−1 is also an element of S. Moreover, if N = ( a′ b′c′ d′ ) ∈ S,
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then
MN =
aa′ + bc′ ab′ + bd′
a′c+ c′d b′c+ dd′
 .
Since b, c′ (respectively b′c) are even, then bc′ ≡ 0 (mod 4) (respecively b′c ≡ 0 (mod 4)).
Since a, a′ (respectively d, d′) are all congruent to 1 modulo 4, then aa′ ≡ dd′1 (mod 4).
This shows that entries aa′ + bc′ and b′c+ dd′ are congruent to 1 modulo 4. Similarly, since
b, b′, c, c′ are even, then ab′ + bd′ and a′c + c′d are even, so MN ∈ S, and therefore S is a
subgroup of SL2(Z).
Hence, since A(2), A(2)−1, B(2), B(2)−1 are elements of S, any element of 〈A(2), B(2)〉
can be written in the form (∗).
The other direction is trickier. To see an element of S is in 〈A(2), B(2)〉, we induct on the
size of the largest matrix entry (in absolute value). There are many cases to consider, but in
each case, multiplication by one of A(2), A(2)−1, B(2), B(2)−1 will decrease the maximum
entry (in absolute value). The base case is just the identity matrix, which is obviously an
element of 〈A(2), B(2)〉. So suppose all matrices with maximum entry (in absolute value)
less than or equal to k−1 can be written as a word in A(2) and B(2), and consider a matrix
M
(
1+4m1 2m2
2m3 1+4m4
)
with maximum entry (in absolute value) equal to k. Then
MA(2) =
1 + 4m1 2 + 8m1 + 2m2
2m2 1 + 4m4 + 4m3
 ,
M(A(2))−1 =
1 + 4m1 2m2 − 2− 8m1
2m3 1 + 4m4 − 4m3
 ,
MB(2) =
1 + 4m1 + 4m2 2m2
2m3 + 2 + 8m4 1 + 4m4
 ,
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M(B(2))−1 =
1 + 4m1 − 4m2 2m2
2m3 − 2− 8m4 1 + 4m4
 .
Suppose additionally that mi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Then, if either the upper left or bottom
left entry is the largest, multiplication on the right by (B(2))−1 will result in a matrix with
largest entry less than k. By the inductive hypothesis, that matrix can be written as a word
in A(2) and B(2), and so M is an element of 〈A(2), B(2)〉. Similarly, if either the upper
right or bottom right entry is the largest, multiplication on the right by (A(1))−1 will reduce
the largest entry to something less than k, so we conclude M is an element of 〈A(2), B(2)〉.
The remaining cases for whether each mi is positive or negative follow similarly.
This does not say much about the monoid generated by these matrices, though. In
fact, a generic matrix of the form above would not belong to this monoid. This is true for
two reasons: first, by another result of Sanov [47], the matrices A(2) and B(2) generate a
free group. Second, the number of matrices in the above form which are representable by
positive words is negligible. In fact, the number of distinct elements represented by all freely
reducible words in A(2) and B(2) of length n ≥ 2 is 4 · 3n−1, while the number of distinct
elements represented by positive words of length n ≥ 2 is 2n.
Tillich and Ze´mor’s lifting attack can still give an efficient algorithm which finds relations
of length O(log p) in the group generated by A(2) and B(2) considered as matrices over Fp.
This algorithm is described below, but we note that it does not affect the security of the
hash function based on A(2) and B(2) since only positive powers of A(2) and B(2) are used,
and the group relations produced by the algorithm will involve both negative and positive
powers with overwhelming probability.
Theorem 2. (Bromberg, Shpilrain and Vdovina [5, Theorem 1]) There is an efficient
heuristic algorithm that finds particular relations of the form w(A(2), B(2)) = 1, where w is
a group word of length O(log p), and the matrices A(2) and B(2) are considered over Fp.
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Proof. The following were shown in [52].
(a) For any prime p, there is an efficient heuristic algorithm that finds positive integers
k1, k2, k3, k4 such that the matrix1 + k1p k2p
k3p 1 + k4p

has determinant 1 and all ki are of about the same magnitude O(p
2).
(b) A generic matrix from part (a) has an efficient factorization (in SL(2,Z)) in a product of
positive powers of A(1) and B(1), of length O(log p). (This obviously yields a collision
in SL(2,Fp) since the matrix from part (a) equals the identity matrix in SL(2,Fp).)
Now we combine these results with the aforementioned result of Sanov the following way.
We are going to multiply a matrix from (a) (call it M) by a matrix from SL(2,Z) (call it S)
with very small (between 0 and 5 by the absolute value) entries, so that the resulting matrix
M ·S has the form as in Sanov’s result. Since the matrix M , by the Tillich-Ze´mor results, has
an efficient factorization (in SL(2,Z)) in a product w(A(1), B(1)) of positive powers of A(1)
and B(1) of length O(log p), the same holds for the matrix M · S. Then, since the matrix
M ·S is in “Sanov’s form”, we know that it is, in fact, a product of powers of A(2) and B(2).
Now we need one more ingredient to efficiently re-write a product of A(1) and B(1) into
a product of A(2) and B(2) without blowing up the length too much. This procedure is
provided by Epstein, Cannon, Holt, Levy, Paterson and Thurston in [11, Theorem 2.3.10].
We cannot explain it without introducing a lot of background material, but the fact is that,
since the group SL(2,Z) is hyperbolic (whatever that means) and the subgroup generated
by A(2) and B(2) is quasiconvex (whatever that means), there is a quadratic time algorithm
(in the length of the word w(A(1), B(1))) that re-writes w(A(1), B(1)) into a u(A(2), B(2))
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such that w(A(1), B(1)) = u(A(2), B(2)) and the length of u is bounded by a constant
(independent of w) times the length of w.
Thus, what is now left to complete the proof is to exhibit, for all possible matrices M as
in part (a) above, particular “small” matrices S such that M ·S is in “Sanov’s form”. We are
therefore going to consider many different cases corresponding to possible combinations of
residues modulo 4 of the entries of the matrix M (recall that M has to have determinant 1),
and in each case we are going to exhibit the corresponding matrix S such that M · S is in
“Sanov’s form”. Denote by Mˆ the matrix of residues modulo 4 of the entries of M . Since
the total number of cases is too large, we consider matrices Mˆ “up to a symmetry”.
(1) Mˆ =
 1 0
1 1
, S =
 1 0
1 1

(2) Mˆ =
 1 0
2 1
, S =
 1 0
2 1

(3) Mˆ =
 1 0
3 1
, S =
 1 0
3 1

(4) Mˆ =
 2 1
1 1
, S =
 1 3
3 2

(5) Mˆ =
 2 3
3 1
, S =
 3 1
1 2

(6) Mˆ =
 2 3
1 2
, S =
 0 1
3 2

(7) Mˆ =
 2 1
1 3
, S =
 1 3
3 2

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(8) Mˆ =
 2 3
3 3
, S =
 1 1
1 2

(9) Mˆ =
 3 3
0 1
, S =
 3 3
0 1

(10) Mˆ =
 3 0
0 3
, S =
 −1 0
0 −1

(11) Mˆ =
 3 0
1 3
, S =
 −1 0
1 −1

(12) Mˆ =
 3 0
2 3
, S =
 −1 0
2 −1

(13) Mˆ =
 3 0
3 3
, S =
 −1 0
3 −1

(14) Mˆ =
 3 2
2 3
, S =
 −1 2
2 −5

This completes the proof.
4.3.4 Girth of the Cayley graph generated by A(k) and B(k)
For hashing, we use only positive powers, so we need only consider products of positive
powers of A(k) and B(k). We note that entries in a matrix of a length n product of positive
powers of A(k) and B(k) grow fastest (as functions of n) in the alternating product of A(k)
and B(k). This is formalized in [5, Proposition 1 and Lemma 1].
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Proposition 3. Let wn(a, b) be an arbitrary positive word of even length n, and let Wn =
wn(A(k), B(k)) with k ≥ 2. Let Cn = (A(k) ·B(k))n/2. Then:
(1) The sum of entries in any row of Cn is at least as large as the sum of entries in any
row of Wn.
(2) The largest entry of Cn is at least as large as the sum of entries of Wn.
Proof. First note that multiplying a matrix X by A(k) on the right amounts to adding the
first column multiplied by k to the second column. Similarly, multiplying on the right by
B(k) amounts to adding the second column multiplied by k to the first column. In particular,
this means that when we build a word in A(k) and B(k), going from left to right, elements
of the first row change independently of elements of the second row. So, we can consider
only pairs of positive integers. The proposition will follow from the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (x, y) be a pair of positive integers, x 6= y, and let k ≥ 2. One can apply
transformations of the following two kinds: transformation R takes (x, y) to (x, y + kx);
tranformation L takes (x, y) to (x+ ky, y). Among all sequences of these transformations of
the same length, the sequence where R and L alternate results in:
(1) the largest sum of elements in the final pair;
(2) the largest maximum element in the final pair.
Proof. We will prove (1) and (2) simultaneously by inducting on the length of a sequence
of transformations. So suppose the lemma holds for all sequences of length at most m ≥ 2,
with the same initial pair (x, y), and suppose the final pair after m alternating transforma-
tions is (X, Y ). Without loss of generality, assume that X < Y ; this means that the last
transformation applied was R. Now, applying transformation L to (X, Y ) gives (X+kY, Y ),
while applying transformation R to (X, Y ) gives (X, Y + kX). Since we assumed X < Y ,
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we have X + kY > Y + kX, so applying L results in a larger sum of elements as well as in
a larger maximum element. Thus, we have a sequence of m+ 1 alternating transformations;
there is one case left to consider.
Suppose some sequence of m transformations applied to (x, y) results in a pair (X ′, Y ′)
with X ′+Y ′ < X+Y, Y ′ < Y but X ′ > X. Applying L to this pair gives (X”+kY ′, Y ′) and
the sum is X ′+Y ′+kY ′ < X+Y +kY , since X ′+Y ′ < X+Y and Y ′ < Y . The maximum
element of the pair (X ′+kY ′, Y ′) is X ′+kY ′ = X ′+Y ′+ (k−1)Y ′. Since X ′+Y ′ < X+Y
and Y ′ < Y , we have X ′ + kY ′ < X + kY . This completes the proof of the lemma.
The proposition follows.
Thus we consider powers of the matrix
C(k) := A(k)B(k) (4.3)
to get to entries larger than p “as quickly as possible”.
4.3.5 Powers of C(2)
The matrix C(2) is 5 2
2 1
 .
If we denote
(C(2))n =
an bn
cn dn
 ,
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then the following recurrence relations are easily proved by induction on n:
an = 5an−1 + 2bn−1,
bn = cn = 2an−1 + bn−1,
dn = an−1.
Combining the recurrence relations for an and bn, we get 2bn = an − an−1, so 2bn−1 =
an−1 − an−2. Plugging this into the displayed recurrence relation for an gives
an = 6an−1 − an−2.
Similarly, we get
bn = 6bn−1 − bn−2.
Solving these recurrence relations (with appropriate initial conditions), we get
an =
(1
2
+
1√
8
)
(3 +
√
8)n +
(1
2
− 1√
8
)
(3−
√
8)n,
bn =
1√
8
(3 +
√
8)n − 1√
8
(3−
√
8)n.
Thus, an is the largest entry of (C(2))
n, and we conclude that no entry of (C(2))n is larger
than p as long as n < log3+
√
8 p. Since C(2) = A(2)B(2) is a product of two generators,
(C(2))n has length 2n as a word in the generators A(2) and B(2). Therefore, no two positive
words of length ≤ m in the generators A(2) and B(2) (considered as matrices over Fp) can
be equal as long as
m < 2 log3+
√
8 p = log
√
3+
√
8
p,
so we have the following.
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Corollary 1. There are no collisions of the form
u(A(2), B(2)) = v(A(2), B(2))
if positive words u and v are of length less than log√
3+
√
8
p. In particular, the girth of the
Cayley graph of the semigroup generated by A(2) and B(2) (considered as matrices over Fp)
is at least log√
3+
√
8
p.
The base of the logarithm here is
√
3 +
√
8 ≈ 2.4. Thus, for example, if p is on the order
of 2256, then there are no collisions of the form u(A(2), B(2)) = v(A(2), B(2)) if positive
words u and v are of length less than 203.
4.3.6 Powers of C(3)
If we consider the matrices A(3) and B(3) as generators of SL(2,Fp).The matrix C(3) is
10 3
3 1
 .
If we let
(C(3))n =
an bn
cn dn
 ,
and use the fact that (C(3))n = C(3) · C(3)n−1, we get the following recurrence relations:
an = 10an−1 + 3bn−1
bn = 3an−1 + bn−1 = cn
dn = an−1
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Combining these recurrence relations for an and bn, we get
an = 11an−1 − an−2, bn = 11bn−1 − bn−2.
Solving these recurrence relations with the initial conditions a1 = 10, a2 = 109 and b1 = 3,
b2 = 33, we get
an =
( 9
2
√
117
+
1
2
)(11 +√117
2
)
+
(1
2
− 9
2
√
117
)(11−√117
2
)
,
bn =
3√
117
(11 +√117
2
)
− 3√
117
(11−√117
2
)
.
From this we see that an is the largest entry of (C(3))
n, so no entry of (C(3))n is larger
than p if n < log 11+√117
2
p. Since C(3) is a product of two generators, A(3) and B(3), we
have:
Corollary 2. There are no collisions of the form
u(A(3), B(3)) = v(A(3), B(3))
if positive words u and v are of length less than 2 log 11+√117
2
p = log√
11+
√
117
2
p. In particular,
the girth of the Cayley graph of the semigroup generated by A(3) and B(3) (considered as
matrices over Fp) is at least log√
11+
√
117
2
p.
The base of the logarithm here is
√
11+
√
117
2
≈ 3.3. For example, if p is on the order
of 2256, then there are no collisions of the form u(A(2), B(2)) = v(A(2), B(2)) if positive
words u and v are of length less than 149.
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Conclusions
We have analyzed the girth of the Cayley graph of both the group and the monoid generated
by matrices A(k) and B(k) over Fp for various k. We conclude the following.
First, the lifting attack by Tillich and Ze´mor [52] which produces explicit relations of
length O(log p) in the monoid generated by A(1) and B(1) can be used in conjunction
with Sanov’s result [47] and some results from [11] to efficiently produce relations of length
O(log p) in the group generated by A(2) and B(2). Generically, the relations produced by
this method will involve both positive and negative powers of A(2) and B(2). Therefore,
this method does not produce collision for the corresponding hash function, since the hash
function only uses positive powers of A(2) and B(2).
Since there is no known analog of Sanov’s result for A(3) and B(3), at this time there
is no known efficient algorithm for even producing relations of length O(log p) in the group
generated by A(3) and B(3), let alone in the monoid. We note that by the pigeonhole
principle, such relations do in fact exist.
We have computed an explicit lower bound of logb p for the length of relations in the
monoid generated by A(2) and B(2), where b ≈ 2.4. For the monoid generated by A(3)
and B(3), we have a similar lower bound with base b ≈ 3.3.
We conclude that at this time, there are no known attacks on hash functions correspond-
ing to the pair A(2) and B(2) nor on the pair A(3) and B(3). Therefore, there is no visible
threat to their security.
Problems for future research
We list here some problems for future research on these Cayley hash functions.
Problem 1. Find a description, similar to Sanov’s, for matrices in the monoid generated
by A(2) and B(2) over Z.
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Problem 2. Find an analogue of “Sanov’s form” for the subgroup of SL(2,Z) generated by
A(3), B(3).
Problem 3. Determine which words in the matrices A(1), B(2) will have the fastest growth
of their entries, i.e. find analogues to Proposition 3 and Lemma 2.
This problem is of interest because if we can show the alternating product again has
fastest growth, then a similar calculation as was done for A(2), B(2) and for A(3), B(3)
would show a lower bound with a smaller base. This means that the base of the logarithm is√
2 +
√
3, which is about 1.93. So this would mean that for p on the order of 2256, there will
be no collisions of the form u(A(1), B(2)) = v(A(1), B(2)) if positive words u and v are of
length less than 269 = log√
2+
√
3
(p). This is a stronger bound than for either the A(2), B(2)
case or the A(3), B(3) case.
4.4 Hashing with Burnside groups
In this section we discuss the use of matrices corresponding to homomorphisms of the Burn-
side group of order 3 on n generators, denoted Bn. Recall from Chapter 2 the endomorphism
on Bn given by
ai 7→ ai+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
an 7→ a1an.
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Let Mn denote the matrix corresponding (via the abelianization; see Section 2.5.1) to the
above endomorphism, i.e.,
Mn =

0 1 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 1
1 0 0 · · · 0 1

.
Recall that |M22| = 15, 625, 959, 602 and |M24| = 10, 460, 353, 202. Then the order of the
block matrix M , where
M =
M22 0
0 M24
 ,
is the least common multiple of |M22| and |M24|, which is greater than 265. To hash with this
matrix, let M be the hash of the 0 bit and P−1MP the hash of the 1 bit, where P is a random
invertible 46 by 46 matrix. Recall that since the abelianization is a homomorphism, the order
of the matrix here divides the order of the corresponding endomorphism. In particular, the
order of the endomorphism has 265 as a divisor.
4.5 Computations and efficiency
In this section we include results of some experiments done to test the efficiency of the
proposed hashes. On the one hand, we consider hashing with a 46× 46 matrix over Z3 (see
Section 4.4) and on the other hand we hash with 2× 2 matrices over Fp for a large prime p.
We conducted several tests, performed on a computer with an Intel Core i7 quad-core
4.0 GHz processor and 16 GB of RAM, running Linux Mint version 17.1 with Python ver-
sion 3.4.1, NumPy version 1.9.1.
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Since we are working within the abelianization of the Burnside groups Bn of exponent 3,
the entries of the matrices are essentially elements of Z3. This means we are not really
concerned with reducing modulo a prime p, since p is so small, but rather the multiplication
is done with use of a simple multiplication table. If the exponent were larger, we would need
to take reduction modulo the exponent into account for computation.
Using GAP [14], we generated a random 46 × 46 matrix M over Z3, and noted how
long it took to compute M10,000. The result was that it took, on average, 1000 milliseconds.
Since GAP is not the most efficient computer system for matrix multiplication (it is a far
better tool for more complicated group algorithms), compare this to the time for the same
computation using Python: 970 milliseconds.
Working with 2 × 2 matrices over a large field Fp for large prime p, we note that mul-
tiplication of the matrices themselves is quite fast (can be done in 7 multiplications), but
reduction modulo p takes more work. To test the efficiency with multiplication in SL2(Fp),
we conducted two experiments, both with p = 2127 − 1. In the first, we chose a random
number between 1 and 1, 000, 000, found a matrix M as a word in A(2) and B(2) of that
length, then computed that it took approximately 80 milliseconds to compute M10,000. In the
second experiment, we determined that it took approximately 30 milliseconds to compute a
matrix as a word of length 10, 000 in A(2) and B(2) over F2127−1.
For comparison, see [8] for performance results of various cryptographic functions. In
particular, SHA-512 hashes approximately 99 MiB/second (MiB stands for mebibyte, and
1 MiB = 220 bytes) and so this is roughly 108 bytes per second. Our proposed hash (the
second experiment) also hashes approximately 108 bytes per second. Moreover, SHA-512 has
been optimized; our hash performs at this speed without any optimization. For instance,
our computations involve performing the reduction modulo p at each step.
Also, our computation can be parallelized, whereas SHA-512 (and others in the SHA
family) cannot. This is because our bitstrings can be broken up into smaller parts, hashed,
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and then “put back together:” for instance, if H denotes the hash function, and the message
M = ABC, then H(M) = H(ABC) = H(A)H(B)H(C). This is not true with SHA hashes.
We conclude that using small matrices over large field yields faster multiplication time
than using large matrices over a small field. It is hard to say, however, what particular
algorithms NumPy and GAP use to reduce modulo prime numbers, i.e. whether (and how)
these programs capitalize on the efficiency of “reduction modulo 3” and multiplication of
2× 2 matrices.
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